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FOREWORD: SUPREME COURT REVIEW (1972)
not departed from these views. It is my profound
hope that the Court will not.
Justice Black, in one of his last opinions, de-
scribed the Court as a "palladium of justice" and
"citadel of liberty." I profoundly believe that the
Supreme Court is such a court.
In the perspective of time, it will be the measure
of the Burger Court, as it is of all courts, to act
in the great tradition of the judge's creed stated
by Lord Mansfield long ago:
I will not do that which my conscience tells me
is wrong to gain the huzzahs of thousands, or the
daily praise of all the papers which come from the
press. I will not avoid doing what I think is right,
though it should draw on me the whole artillery
of libels, all that falsehood and malice can invent,
or the credulity of a deluded populace can swallow.
... Once for all let it be understood, that no en-
deavors of this kind will influence any man who
at present sits here.
SIXTH AMENDMENT-RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Misdemeanor Prosecutions:
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 (1972)
In Argersinger v. Hamlin; the United States
Supreme Court squarely confronted an issue which
has haunted federal and state courts since Gideon
v. Wainwright2 applied the sixth amendment right
to counsel to the states through the fourteenth
amendment due process clause: Is an indigent
accused of committing a misdemeanor entitled
to appointed counsel?
The defendant in Argersinger was convicted
without couniel of carrying a concealed weapon, a
misdemeanor punishable by up to six months im-
prisonment and a $1,000 fine, and was sentenced
to 90 days in jail. He petitioned the Florida
supreme court for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging
that his sixth amendment right to counsel had
been denied. The Florida court previously had
held in Fish v. State and in subsequent decisions4
that only indigents accused of felonies were en-
titled to counsel as a matter of right. However,
the Florida court agreed to take original jurisdiction
in Argersinger's case in order to reexamine its
previous decisions in light of a conflicting line of
cases in the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,5
1407 U.S. 25 (1972).
2372 U.S. 335 (1963).
159 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 1964).
4 State ex rel. Taylor v. Warden, 193 So. 2d 606(Fla. 1967); Watkins v. Morris, 179 So. 2d 348 (Fla.
1965).5Bohr v. Purdy, 412 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1969);
James v. Headley, 410 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1969); Boyer
v. City of Orlando, 402 F.2d 966 (5th Cir. 1968);
Goslin v. Thomas, 400 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1968); Mc-
Donald v. Moore, 353 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1965); Harvey
v. Mississippi, 340 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1965).
and in light of the Supreme Court's holding in
Duncan v. Louisiaua.6
In Duncan, the Supreme Court applied the
sixth amendment right to trial by jury to the
states through the fourteenth amendment due
process clause, "in all criminal cases which-were
they to be tried in a federal court-would come
within the Sixth Amendment's guarantee." 7 The
Court concluded, based on Chef v. Scinacken berg,8
that only "serious offenses" come within the pur-
view of the sixth amendment right to trial by
jury. Without actually defining "serious offenses,"
the Court held that the crime in Duncan, which
carried a two year potential penalty, was suffi-
ciently serious so as to require a jury trial. Ex-
cluded from the Court's holding were "petty of-
fenses" as defined by 18 U.S.C.§1 (1948):
Crimes carrying possible penalties up to six months
do not require a jury trial if they otherwise qualify
as petty offenses.9
In deciding Argersinger the Florida supreme
court presumed that the United States Supreme
Court would extend the same principles to the
right to counsel as were applied in Duncan to the
right to trial by jury. Noting that the sixth months
standard was also adopted in Brinson v. State, °
the Florida court concluded that the right to coun-
sel "extends only to trials for non-petty offenses
6391 U.S. 145 (1968).7 Id. at 149.
8384 U.S. 373 (1966).
9 391 U.S. at 159.10 273 F. Supp. 840 (S.D. Fla. 1967).
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punishable by more than six months imprison-
ment."u Since Argersinger's offense was only pun-
ishable by a maximum of six months, the writ was
discharged.
2
The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari and unanimously reversed the decision.
Rejecting Florida's limitation on the right to
counsel, the Court in Argersinger held that,
absent a knowing waiver, no person may be im-
prisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty,
misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented
by counsel at his trial.13
In arriving at this seemingly sweeping extension
of the right to counsel, 4 the Court relied primarily
on language in Powell v. Alabama,15 Gideon v. Wain-
wright,1 and the sixth amendment itself. 7 Although
Powell was a capital case and Gideon involved a
felony, in neither case was the decision explicitly
limited to those factual circumstances.
The decision in Powell, which held that a state's
denial of counsel to a defendant could violate
due process in special circumstances, was pred-
icated on the proposition that the assistance of
counsel is essential to a fair trial:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of
little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be
heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated
layman has small and sometimes no skill in the
science of law.... He lacks both the skill and knowl-
edge adequately to prepare his defense even though
he may have a perfect one. He requires the guiding
hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings
against him.... If that be true of men of intelli-
gence, how much more true is it of the ignorant
and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect."
While Powell made no attempt to decide to what
extent the sixth amendment might be applicable to
1 State ex rel. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 236 So. 2d
442, 443 (Fla. 1970).
"1 Id. at 444.
"3 407 U.S. at 37.
14 According to recent estimates, between four and
five million misdemeanor cases are tried nationally per
year, plus an additional 50 million traffic offenses. Id.
at 34 & n.4. These statistics do not reflect the number of
cases which will be affected by Argersinger, however.
Of the estimated five million non-traffic misdemeanors,
only some one and a quarter million involve indigents.
Junker, The Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 43
WAsH. L. REv. 685, 716 (1968).
15 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
16 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
'
7 U.S. CONsT. amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense."
"8 287 U.S. at 68-69.
the states, the Court in Gideon relied on that deci-
sion in determining that the sixth amendment
right to counsel was a fundamental right fully ap-
plicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment due process clause. Although Mr.
Justice Harlan, concurring in Gideon, disputed the
notion that Gideon would require the application of
the full scope of the federal right to the states,1 the
language of the majority opinion delineated a vir-
tually unrestricted right to counsel:
[R]eason and reflection require us to recognize that
in our adversary system of criminal justice, any
person haled into court, . . . cannot be assured of a
fair trial unless counsel is appointed for him. This
seems to us to be an obvious truth."
While Gideon was never authoritatively inter-
preted to require the appointment of counsel in all
criminal cases irrespective of the seriousness of the
offense, Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the ma-
jority in Argersinger, relied on the rationale of
Gideon in extending the right to counsel to misde-
meanor prosecutions. The purpose of counsel, as
articulated in Powell and Gideon, and reiterated in
Argersinger,21 is to assure a fair trial and to preserve
other important constitutional rights, like the right
against self-incrimination, the right to confront
witnesses, the right to object to improper evidence,
and the right to a meaningful appeal." Since all of
these rights exist for petty as well as serious of-
fenses, counsel is essential regardless of the offense
charged.
Decisions made prior to Gideon involving the
right to counsel in federal cases support this broad
interpretation of the sixth amendment guarantee.
In Johnson v. Zerbst," the Supreme Court made no
distinction between felonies and misdemeanors, or
"serious" and "petty" offenses:
The Sixth Amendment withholds from federal
courts, in all criminal proceedings, the power and
1"372 U.S. at 352.
"Id. at 344.
21407 U.S. at 31.
2Other rights at stake include the right to a public
trial, In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948); the right to
cross-examine witnesses, District of Columbia v. CIa-
wans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937); the right against self-in-
crimination applied to the states to the full extent it is
applied federally, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964);
the right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures, also applied fully to the states, Ker v. Cali-
fornia, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961); and the rights to a speedy trial and to be in-
formed of the nature and cause of the accusation, none
of which have been limited to "serious" offenses.
304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938) (emphasis added).
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authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty
unless he has or waives the assistance of counsel.
Johnson, however, involved an actual sentence of
43 years so could not be said to have resolved the
question of whether an indigent accused of a
"petty" offense is entitled to appointed counsel in
the federal courts.24
But, in Evans v. Rives,25 a case involving a one
year sentence, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia did consider the argument that counsel
is required only where the offense is serious, and
said:
It is... suggested ... that the constitutional guar-
antee of the right to the assistance of counsel in a
criminal case does not apply except in the event of
"serious offenses." No such differentiation is made
in the wording of the guarantee itself, and we are
cited to no authority, and know of none making
this distinction.
6
Although Mr. Justice Douglas had ample prece-
dent to support his expansive interpretation of the
right to counsel, prior to Argersinger a substantial
number of state and federal courts arrived at a
more limited view of the right to counsel, extending
the right only to indigents accused of serious crimes.
The distinction between serious and petty offenses
for the purpose of applying the sixth amendment
right to counsel comes from two main sources. The
first in Gideon itself, which involved a felony and
was interpreted in some cases as limiting the right
to counsel to felony prosecutions.n Many state and
federal courts, reluctant to strain already over-
taxed judicial machinery, seized on Supreme Court
2 The issue had since been resolved by the Supreme
Court acting in its supervisory power over the federal
courts. In 1966, Rule 44 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure was amended to require the appointment of
counsel in all criminal prosecutions, which includes
petty offenses, tried in a federal court. However, this
requirement is not of constitutional dimension.
2S 126 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
26Id. at 638. In holding that the defendant was
entitled to counsel regardless of the seriousness of the
offense, the court in Evans relied primarily on an ex-
pansive reading of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458
(1938).
27 See, e.g., Wall v. Purdy, 321 F. Supp. 367 (S.D.
Fla. 1971); Cableton v. Slate, 243 Ark. 351, 420 S.W.2d
534 (1967); Fish v. State, 159 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 1964);
Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt, 58 N.J. 281, 277 A.2d 216(1971); Hortencio v. Fills, 25 Utah 2d 73, 475 P.2d
1011 (1970); Hendrix v. City of Seattle, 76 Wash. 2d
142, 456 P.2d 696 (1969). See also Junker, supra note
14, at 723 & n.199, for a listing of those jurisdictions
which limited by statute the right to appointed counsel
to felonies.
language in Mempa v. Rha 23M and it re Gault 9,
which referred to the Gideon holding as establishing
a right to counsel in felony cases, as a basis for
denying counsel to accused misdemeanants.
Other courts recognizing that the right to coun-
sel had never been expressly limited to felonies,
nonetheless attempted to establish some cut-off
point, based on the seriousness of the offense, for
applying the right. The court in Wooley v. Consoli-
dated City of Jacksonville arrived at a compromise
which used more than 90 days potential penalty
as the point at which the right to counsel would
attach. The Arizona supreme court in State v.
Anderson7' held that counsel must be provided for
serious misdemeanors in light of Patterson v. War-
denY In Patterson the Supreme Court remanded a
Maryland case for further consideration in light of
Gideon, where the offense was a misdemeanor pun-
ishable by up to two years imprisonment. In James
v. Headle the court concluded that the sixth
amendment required counsel in all criminal prose-
cutions, but suggested that there might be a class
of cases in which the consequences of conviction
were so slight that the appointment of counsel in
those cases would be unnecessary. In each of these
cases the desire to avoid the administrative prob-
lems of appointing counsel in all criminal prosecu-
tions was the primary motivation for devising a
more restrictive standard than previous right to
counsel cases would warrant.
The second source of the "serious offense" test
came from cases involving the sixth amendment
right to trial by jury, most notably Duncan v.
Louisiana'4 and Baldwin v. New York. 5 Taken to-
-389 U.S. 128 (1967). In Mempa, Mr. Justice
Marshall commented that "in Gideon v. Wainwright
... this Court held.., that there was an absolute right
to appointment of counsel in felony cases." Id. at 134.
29387 U.S. 1 (1967). Here the Court said: "He [thejuvenile] would be entitled to clear advice that he could
be represented by counsel and, at least if a felony were
involved, the State would be required to provide coun-
sel ... ." Id. at 29. Later in the opinion the Court said:
"If they [the juvenile's parents] were unable to employ
counsel they were entitlted, in view of the seriousness
of the charge and the potential commitment to ap-
pointed counsel unless they chose waiver." Id. at 42.
20 308 F. Supp. 1194 (M.D. Fla. 1970).
3196 Ariz. 123, 392 P.2d, 784 (1964).
372 U.S. 776 (1963).
a3 410 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1969).
34 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
35 399 U.S. 66 (1970). While Duncan clearly ex-
cepted cases where the possible penalty was under six
months from the jury trial requirement, Baldwin estab-
lished that "no offense can be deemed 'petty' for pur-
poses of the right to trial by jury where imprisonment
for more than six months is authorized." Id. at 69.
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gether these two cases establish six months poten-
tial penalty as the cut-off line between serious and
petty offenses for the purpose of applying the right
to trial by jury-. Since this right, like the right to
counsel, is contained in the sixth amendment, the
"serious offense" test promulgated by the jury
trial cases has been applied to the right to
counsel by analogy.16
The Supreme Court in Argersinger, however,
concluded that the purposes and roots of the two
rights were sufficiently distinct so as to require a
different standard for each. In rejecting the "seri-
ous offense" test, Mr. Justice Douglas quoted with
approval the reasoning of Judge Wisdom in James
v. Headley:n
Because a charge is petty enough to lie outside the
jurytrial requirement does not mean that it is also
petty enough to allow the suspension of the right
to counsel. The petty offense concept has not been
applied uniformly to all Sixth Amendment rights.
The jury, of course, is a treasured part of the
American system of criminal justice but it occupies
a less fundamental position than the right to coun-
sel in a criminal case because it is not so interwoven
with other rights.... Trials are held daily by a
judge alone without derogation to the right against
self-incrimination, the right to confront witnesses,
... the right to compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses. The same cannot be said of trials at which
the defendant lacks an attorney's aid. And none of
these rights turn upon the seriousness of the offense
for which the defendant is tried.
Mr. Justice Douglas also noted that under the
common law the two rights were applied differ-
ently. Trial by jury was limited to serious casesn
whereas the right to counsel was originally re-
stricted to misdemeanor cases in England and later
extended to felonies in the American colonies.39
The rule established by the Court in Argersinger
extends the right to counsel to all criminal cases
where the accused will be deprived of his liberty.
It is a flat prohibition against the incarceration of
an indigent where counsel was not retained:
36 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Singleton v. Woods,
440 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1971); State ex rel. Argersinger
v. Hamlin, 236 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1970); State v. McClam,
7 N.C. App. 477, 173 S.E.2d 53 (1970).
S410 F.2d 325, 331-333 (5th Cir. 1969) (footnote
omitted).
Is See Frankfurter and Corcoran, Petty Offenses and
the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 HI6,v.
L. Rxv. 917 (1926). Cf. Kaye, Petty Offenders Have No
Peers, 26 U. Cm. L. Rxv. 245 (1959).
39 407 U.S. at 30.
Under the rule we announce today, every judge
will know when the trial of a misdemeanor starts,
that no imprisonment may be imposed, even
though local law permits it, unless the accused is
represented by counsel. 40
The rule does not require that counsel be ap-
pointed in all criminal prosecutions where there is
any potential jail sentence; it merely prohibits a
defendant from being imprisoned when he was
denied the assistance of counsel during his trial.
Thus, on appeal the crucial factor in determining
whether a defendant's right to counsel was abridged
will be whether the defendant was actually sen-
tenced to jail rather than whether there was a
potential jail sentence for the offense. The use of
this "imprisonment in fact" 4 standard, as opposed
to "potential penalty" analysis, creates a special
problem for trial judges who must make the deci-
sion to appoint counsel prior to a determination
of innocence or guiit, and prior to sentencing. Trial
judges must either appoint counsel in all cases to
avoid having to retry a defendant convicted and
sentenced to jail without counsel, or forego the
option of imposing jail sentence before fully con-
sidering the merits of a defendant's case or his prior
record.
Although the Argersinger "imprisonment in
fact" standard may be difficult to apply, it is
logically related to the purpose of the right it is
designed to protect. The "potential penalty" stand-
ard is appropriate where the existence of the right
is dependent on the seriousness of the offense. 'To-
tential penalty" measures "seriousness" because it
reflects the degree to which society condemns the
conduct involved in the offense. However, the sixth
amendment right to counsel, according to the
Court's holding in Argersinger, is not dependent on
the seriousness of the offense, but is designed to
prevent the actual deprivation of liberty where the
defendant was denied due process of law-in this
case, the right to counsel.
In addition, by formulating the rule in this man-
ner, the Court has provided a limited option to
those jurisdictions without the resources to appoint
counsel in all cases where there is a potential jail
sentence. This option to impose fines instead of
imprisonment for unrepresented indigents could
40 Id. at 40.
4' The term "imprisonment in fact" has been used
by commentators to describe the standard for applying
the right to counsel now adopted by the Supreme Court
in Argersinger. See, Junker, supra, note 14, and Kami-
sar and Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota:
Some Field Findings and Legal Policy Observations, 48
MIN. L. Rnv. 1 (1963).
[Vol. 63
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take on increased significance if Argersinger were
applied retroactively.2 But, appointing counsel on
a selective basis in cases where imprisonment is
probable if the defendant is convicted requires an
additional pre-trial proceeding which may prove
time-consuming. In light of Argersinger, lower
courts will be forced to develop standards for mak-
ing a pre-trial determination to appoint counsel.
Prior to trial, prosecutors will have to supply the
judge with detailed information about the de-
fendant's record and the offense with which he is
charged so that the judge can make a reasoned
decision whether imprisonment is a likely sentence.
The basis for making this decision is likely to be
the most perplexing aspect of Argersinger for trial
judges. In his opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas pro-
vided little guidance:
We do not sit as an ombudsman to direct state
courts how to manage their affairs but only to make
clear the constitutional requirement. How crimes
should be classified is largely a state matter. The
fact that traffic offenses technically fall within the
category of "ciiminal prosecutions" does not mean
that many of them will be brought into the class
where imprisonment actually occurs. n
The concurring opinions in Argersinger do not
provide much additional insight into the problem.
Mr. Justice Brennan suggests that law students
could prove to be a fertile source of representation
for misdemeanants.41 The Chief Justice notes only
that:
The trial judge and prosecutor will have to engage
in a predictive evaluation of each case to determine
whether there is a significant likelihood that if the
defendant is convicted, the trial judge will sen-
tence him to a jail term.'5
42Gideon was applied retroactively without com-
ment in Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375 U.S. 2 (1963).
However, in Stovall v. Denno, the Supreme Court
noted:
[T]he right to the assistance of counsel has been ap-
plied retroactively at stages of the prosecution where
a denial of the right must almost invariably deny a
fair trial, for example, at the trial itself ....
388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967). Also, where the Court is ap-
plying a flat requirement of the Constitution rather
than a rule of implementation, it has frequently held
that the right must have retroactive application. Dob-
byn, Prospective Limitation of Constitutional Decisions
in Criminal Cases, 30 Mo. L. Rxv. 301, 309 (1971).
One state court has already given Argersinger retro-
active effect, but with no comment as to whether the
defendent must be retried, or could merely be resen-
tenced and fined. People v. Morrissey, No. 44073 (Il.
S. Ct., Oct. 2, 1972).
13 407 U.S. at 38 (footnote omitted).
44 Id. at 40.
41 Id. at 42.
However, in making the decision to appoint counsel
on this basis alone, judges may come perilously
close to pre-judging the defendant, since the deci-
sion to appoint counsel will indicate that a prison
sentence is contemplated. Mr. Justice Powell de-
votes most of his concurring opinion to a critique
of the majority's standard. Justice Powell prefers a
more flexible standard reminiscent of the "special
circumstances" test of Betts v. Brady,46 which would
leave the appointment of counsel to the discretion
of the trial judge "whenever the assistance of coun-
sel is necessary to assure a fair trial." 4
What happens if a defendant is convicted and
sentenced to imprisonment after a trial in which he
was not represented by counsel is a matter for
speculation. Although the Solicitor General, in his
brief in Argersinger, suggested that this problem
could be handled by providing for a trial de novo,
Mr. Justice Powell questioned the legality of such
a procedure:
[A] second trial held for no other reason than to
afford the judge an opportunity to impose a harsher
sentence might run afoul of the guarantee against
being twice placed in jeopardy for the same of-
fense."
The controlling decision on this point is North
Carolina v. Pearce,41 in which the Supreme Court
held that "neither the double jeopardy provision
nor Equal Protection Clause imposes an absolute
bar to a more severe sentence upon reconviction."
But the rationale for this case was that the original
conviction was declared invalid at the defendant's
behest, and thus the slate was wiped dean, prior to
a second trial. The same argument could not be
made where the second trial was held at the state's
instigation.
Finally, given the broad due process basis for the
46316 U.S. 455 (1942). In Betts, the Court held that:
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment does not incorporate, as such, the specific
guarantees found in the Sixth Amendment, although
a denial by a State of rights or privileges specifically
embodied in that and other of the first eight amend-
ments may, in certain circumstances, or in connec-
tion with other elements, operate, in a given case, to
deprive a litigant of due process of law in violation of
the Fourteenth.
Id. at 461-462. The Supreme Court in Gideon explicitly
overruled Belts and concluded that the right to counsel
was of such a fundamental character that it was in-
corporated in the fourteenth amendment. In doing so,
the Court substituted the flat requirement that counsel
be appointed in all criminal prosecutions for the case
by case approach utilized in Betts.
47407 U.S. at 47.
"Id. at 54.
49 395 U.S. 711, 723 (1969).
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Argersinger decision, the question arises whether
any trial can be conducted in the absence of defense
counsel. As Mr. Justice Powell notes in his con-
curring opinion:
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee
that property as well as life and liberty may not
be taken from a person without affording him due
process of law. The majority opinion suggests no
constitutional basis for distinguishing between
deprivations of liberty and property."
Since the majority in Argersinger holds that counsel
is a fundamental element of due process as defined
by the fourteenth amendment, Mr. Justice Powell
sees no constitutional basis for allowing a defendant-
to be deprived of his property as well as his liberty
without the benefit of counsel.
Mr. Justice Powell also predicts that the applica-
tion of the Argersinger standard may result in a
denial of equal protection since an indigent accused
of a misdemeanor may receive counsel in one court
while an indigent accused of the same offense in
another court of the same jurisdiction may not. 51
If, as the majority in Argersinger contends, the
10 407 U.S. at 51.
11 Id. at 54.
Preindictment Lineups:
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U. S. 682 (1972)
After finding that a critical stage of the proceed-
ings for the purposes of the sixth amendment oc-
curs only after de jure criminal proceedings have
commenced, the Supreme Court in Kirby v. Illinois'
held that the right to counsel at lineups attaches
only in post-indictment situations. In a short
plurality opinion written by Justice Stewart 2 the
Court affirmed petitioner's conviction and held
that the Illinois rule3 limiting United States v.
Wade,4 wherein the right to counsel at lineups was
first established, was correct.
The petitioner and co-defendant in Kirby were
arrested two days after a robbery. After their arrest
Kirby and his co-defendant were identified by the
victim in a two-man showup without the presence
of counsel. Petitioner was indicted six ,-ceks after
1406 U.S. 682 (1972).
2Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Rehnquist, as
well as Chief Justice Burger, constituted the plurality.
Mr. Justice Powell concurred in the result.
3 People v. Palmer, 41 1ll. 2d 571, 244 N.E.2d 173
(1969).
4388 U.S. 218 (1967).
services of defense counsel are essential to a fair
trial, the decision to appoint counsel for some de-
fendants and not for others could be viewed as ar-
bitrary and discriminatory." In addition, the deci-
sion not to appoint counsel for a defendant under
Argersinger has the consequence of limiting the
defendant's possible punishment to a fine, whereas
the defendant who receives counsel is subject to the
full range of statutory sanctions provided for his
offense. This results in another kind of discrimina-
tion against the defendant who has counsel.
In holding that no one convicted of a misde-
meanor can be sentenced to jail without the assist-
ance of counsel at trial, the Court in Argersinger
has allowed trial judges to appoint counsel on a
selective basis where there is a possibility of im-
prisonment. But the practical and legal problems
which trial judges will encounter in making the
determination of whether or not to appoint counsel
may result in the adoption of what Mr. Justice
Powell calls a "broad prophylactic rule" " necessi-
tating the appointment of counsel for every de-
fendant accused of a misdemeanor.
5Id.
5Id. at 52.
the identification and was subsequently convicted.
At the trial, the victim identified Kirby and testi-
fied to his previous showup identification at the
police station.
Kirby appealed to the Illinois appellate court.
His conviction was affirmed notwithstanding the
absence of counsel at the showup. 5 The appellate
court held that People v. Palmer,' which limited
right to counsel to post-indictment lineups, con-
trolled, thus eliminating any constitutional error.
The Supreme Court limited certiorari to the
question whether United States v. Wade should "ex-
tend" to pre-indictment lineups. Because the right
to counsel at lineups in Wade was based on the
5 People v. Kirby, 121 Ill. App. 2d 323, 257 N.E.2d
589 (1970). Kirby's co-defendant's conviction was
reversed. People v. Bean, 121 Ill. App. 2d 332, 257
N.E.2d 562 (1970).
'41 Ill. 2d 571, 244 N.E.2d 173 (1969). Several other
states have followed the Illinois rule. See, e.g., State v.
Dessureault, 104 Ariz. 380, 453 P.2d 951 (1969);
Perkins v. State, 228 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 196Q); State v.
Walters, 457 S.W.2d 817 (Mo. 1970); Wright v. State,
46 Wis. 2d 75, 175 N.W.2d 646 (1970).
[Vol. 63
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Court's designation of those identification proce-
dures as critical stages, the Court in Kirby ad-
dressed itself to a consideration of the criticality
of pre-indictment lineups. The Court noted that
the lineups in Wade and its companion case, Gilbert
v. CaliforniaF occurred after indictment. The Court
further noted that, in all but one instance, those
cases where right to counsel was found to exist
because of the "critical" nature of the stage of
prosecution involved a post-indictment situation.8
Consequently, the Kirby Court held that Wade,
Gilbert, and earlier critical stage cases meant that
a critical stage can occur only after indictment
and therefore pre-indictment lineups could not
be critical stages warranting the right to counsel.
Justice Brennan, in a dissent joined by Justices
Douglas and Marshall, vigorously objected to the
plurality's finding that post-arrest "routine police
investigations" in the form of lineups and showups
were not critical stages. The dissenters noted that
the Court in Wade and Gilbert was not influenced
by the fact that the identifications in those cases
occurred after the indictments were returned.
Rather, the dissenters argued, the primary con-
cerns of the Wade Court were the possibilities of
prejudice to an accused caused by lineups. The dis-
senters emphasized the Wade Court's finding that
lineups without counsel could result in unreliable
identifications which would adversely and unfairly
affect the effectiveness of counsel at trial and the
defendant's right to cross-examine witnesses. The
dissenters noted that these possibilities of prejudice
are not eliminated by holding a lineup before an
indictment. They felt that an identification -pro-
ceeding occurring after an arrest was a critical
stage within the plurality's understanding of that
term. They found that police practices and pro-
cedures subsequent to an arrest were in effect prose-
cutorial and accusatorial activities rather than in-
vestigatorial, and therefore were critical stages re-
quiring attachment of the right to counsel.
Although preceding Supreme Court cases which
recognized the right to counsel on the basis of a
critical stage analysis concerned post-indictment
situations,9 none of them found the pre-/post-in-
dictment distinction relevant or controlling. The
Court in Escobedo v. Illinois"' found the principal
7388 U.S. 263 (1967).
8 Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970); Massiah
v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); White v. Mary-
land, 373 U.S. 59 (1963); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368
U.S. 52 (1961). The one exception was Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
9 See note 8 supra.
10 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
criterion for determining whether a situation was a
critical stage to be police activity which was ac-
cusatory rather than investigatory. Kirby is the
first case holding that the critical stage determina-
tion is contingent primarily upon an artificial point
in time-that the event deemed to require the
presence of counsel occur only after indictment.
Police identification procedures in the form of
lineups and showups present an inappropriate basis
for making such an arbitrary determination for
when the right to counsel should attach.
The Court decided United States v. Wade in re-
sponse to objections to the suggestive conduct of
police-orchestrated pretrial identification proceed-
ings and the resulting possibility of prejudicial
effects on a defendant's right to a fair trial." The
prejudice noted by the Court was to the sixth
amendment rights to confrontation and to an effec-
tive defense." Not only the possibility of convic-
tions based on unrelieble evidence obtained in pre-
trial identifications, but also the inability of de-
fendants to expose and impeach this evidence led
to the Court's holding that the right to counsel
must attach at such proceedings.
The lineups and showupsP discussed in Wade
were found to result in identifications of specula-
tive certainty and reliability. The very nature of
the pretrial confrontations created this situation. 4
Moreover, by virtue of the secrecy of the lineups
and the variety of suggestive techniques poten-
tially inherent in them, a defendant was incapable
of attacking the credibility and certainty of a wit-
ness' identification. 5 The Court found that the
inability to acquire knowledge about thes identi-
fications necessarily frustrated any meaningful
n The defendants in United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218 (1967), and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263(1967), did not specifically demonstrate prejudice by
the absence of counsel at their respective lineups. In
fact, the Court remanded both cases to determine
whether counsel's absence was prejudicial to these
petitioners. The Court did however examine the sug-
gestiveness of the lineups in these cases. See 388 U.S.
at 233-34. The Court's discussion of the possibilities
of prejudice resulting from suggestive identification
proceedings was founded primarily on treatises and
commentaries. See id. at 228-34.
I1 Id. at 235.
1" Hereinafter, unless otherwise expressly stated, the
term "lineup" shall refer to all pretrial identification
proceedings except those using photographs and voice
identification. Lineups are procedures in which the
witness is confronted with several individuals at once
and asked to identify one of -them. Showups, on the
other hand, are procedures in which an accused or
suspect is brought before the witness alone and the
witness is asked to identify him.
14 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 235 (1967).
Is Id. at 230-32.
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cross-examination of eyewitnesses. There was no
way a defendant could effectively attempt to im-
peach the credibility of pretrial identifications or
the certainty of in-court identifications. The Court
therefore found that pretrial identification pro-
ceedings withheld from defendants the constitu-
tional right to confront witnesses against them.
1 6
Suggestion, either intentional or unintentional,
was found to be the primary cause of unreliable
identifications. The Court catalogued many cases
and offered several reasons why lineups caused both
unreliable identifications at the proceedings them-
selves and contributed to in-court identifications
of questionable reliability.j7 As with the problem
of cross-examination, it was found that the accused
could do nothing to remedy the inherent prejudice
in the pretrial confrontation. 8
Because they could possibly result in prejudicial
evidence and the loss of the constitutional right to
confront witnesses, pretrial identifications were
held to be critical stages of the proceedings. The
determination by the CourL of the critical nature
of lineups triggered the attachment of the right to
counsel.' In Wade, it was said that the presence of
counsel at pretrial lineups would eliminate tue
prejudice to a defendant caused by unreliable iden-
tifications and ineffectual cross-examination. Citing
previous sixth amendment cases which established
the right to counsel in certain situations on the
basis of their being critical stages,20 the Court in
Wade found that a determination of a lineup's
criticality was necessary.2a The Court found that
lineups themselves are critical stages and made no
distinction between the pre- and post-indictment
criterion established in Kirby.22
16 Id. at 235.7 Id. at 232-34.
18 id. at 235-36.
19 Id. at 236-37.
20 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Massiah
v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); Hamilton v.
Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961); Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45 (1932).
21 This test for the application of the right to counsel
was synthesized in Wade as requiring the court " . . . to
analyze whether potential substantial prejudice to
defendant's rights inheres in the particular confronta-
tion and the ability of counsel to help avoid that preju-
dice." United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967).
Finding that defendants are prejudiced at identifica-
tion confrontations in two significant ways and that
counsel could avert this prejudice, the Court held that
these proceedings by definition necessarily must be
critical stages requiring counsel.
22 The Court in Wade did not make a distinction be-
tween the suggestiveness of pre- and post-indictment
lineups; nor did it at any time even imply that an
accused in a pre-indictment lineup would be any less
The sixth amendment commands that an accused
shall have the assistance of counsel for his defense.P
The courts have used the critical stage analysis to
determine when a particular fact situation requires
the right to counsel in order to fulfill this constitu-
tional command.uA
Situations which impair the effectiveness of
counsel are critical stages by virtue of Powell v.
Alabamna.n Powell held that where one has a right
to counsel, fli- r;gqlt mit attach at the point
where it will have substance and make the defense
effective. That point is the critical stage of the
proceedings.2
6
Knowledge about the witnesses and evidence of
the prosecution have been held important to the
prejudiced than a post-indictment lineup participant.
In discussing the possibilities of prejudice and sugges-
tion, the Wade Court spoke of lineups in an all-inclusive
manner making no reference to the significance or in-
significance of the timing of the lineup. Mr. Justice
White, joined in dissent by Justices Harlan and Stewart,
explicitly noted that the only correct application of
Wade would be to all lineups. Id. at 251 (White, J.,
dissenting). Although White vigorously dissented in
Wade, he also dissented in Kirby. 406 U.S. 705 (1972).23
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right ... to the assistance of Counsel for his
defense." U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
24See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964);
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). Critical
stage is not the only method of determining whether
the right to counsel should attach. Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966), never used this phrase. Rather, it
found the right to counsel necessary as a "protective
device" for the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. Some courts recognize the right to
counsel through an extension of Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963), by finding prosecutorial activity
tantamount to the initiation of the criminal prosecu-
tion. State v. Lucero, 445 P.2d 731 (Mont. 1968).
Furthermore, the right to counsel can be sustained on
grounds other than the sixth amendment. Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), employed the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, and Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), wherein the right to
counsel was granted for appeals, used the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment.
25 287 U.S. 45 (1932). The defendants in Powell were
charged with a capital offense, which, under ALA.
CoDE §5567 (1923) (now ALA. CoDE tit. 15 §318 (Supp.
1971)), entitled them to appointment of counsel. An
attorney was not selected until the day of the trial. The
result of this tardy appointment, the Court held, was
that the right to counsel the defendants had under the
statute was virtually without substance.26 Although Powell was specifically concerned with a
fact situation where trial counsel was appointed too
late to be of much assistance in defending his clients,
the rationale of that case-that the sixth amendment
requires that the state not act so as to inhibit or restrain
the effectiveness of counsel-has been employed in
many of the Supreme Court's succeeding right to
counsel cases. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 UES. 1, 7(1970); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 225
(1967); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 486 (1965);
Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961).
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effectiveness of defense counsel. just as the effec-
tiveness of counsel was held in Powell to depend
on the time he is allowed to prepare his defense,
so also the effectiveness of counsel can depend on
his knowledge of unreliable evidence admitted
against a defendant and his ability to question it.
Because lineups by their suggestiveness can result
in mistaken and unreliable identifications which
could be admitted as evidence in trial, they a
fortiori affect counsel's effectiveness. Counsel's in-
court actions are affected by what occurs at the
lineup. Thus, to the extent that lineups could ad-
versely affect the effectiveness of counsel, they
would be critical stages.
The rationale of preceding Supreme Court cases
in recognizing the right to counsel at critical stages
is that these circumstances are fraught with in-
herent possibilities of prejudice to a defendant's
effective assistance of counsel. 2s The Court in
Kirby did not deny that lineups occurring before
an indictment would or could prejudice a de-
fendant's right to effective assistance of counsel.
By retaining the Wade rights in post-indictment
lineups, it implicitly recognized that lineups do or
can contribute to prejudice. The Court did not
deny that a lineup participant would be prejudiced
by pre-indictment lineups. It simply held that the
right to counsel to remedy such prejudice attaches
only to post-indictment identifications.
This holding is in no way consistent with prior
case law. In other critical stage cases, the Court
addressed itself to the petitioner's need for an at-
torney and granted the right to counsel to the
fullest extent necessary to eliminate the prejudice
to an accused created by counsel's absence. In
those cases where critical stages were found in post-
indictment situations, the scope of the right to
counsel covered all possibilities of injury and preju-
dice created by the fact situations before the
CourtP In Kirby, the Court did not purport to
27 In Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970), the
Court held that preliminary hearings require counsel's
presence because of the opportunities for discovery
which are important for counsel's effectiveness. The
court in Bastida v. Braniff, 444 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1971),
held that effective assistance of counsel was denied
where the defendant's substituted counsel was not
iven a transcript of a suppression hearing until ten
inutes before trial, thus limiting discovery.
28 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Massiah
v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); Hamilton v.
Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961); Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45 (1932).
See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S: 201- (1964);
Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961); Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). See also Coleman v.
protect an accused from all possibilities of prejudice
caused by lineups, but only from those lineups oc-
curring after an indictment. To this extent, the
Supreme Court has made a radical break from prior
case law. By not focusing on the inherent and
unfair possibilities of prejudice and injury to which
a defendant's right to the effective assistance of
counsel would be subject, the Court has discarded
the heretofore recognized basis of critical stage--
the time an accused needs a lawyer most-for the
more arbitrary consideration of whether the time
a defendant needs a lawyer is before or after the
dejure proceedings have commenced.
The more logical avenue open to the Court in
Kirby would have been to hold that lineups them-
selves are not critical stages. 0 Such an approach
would not have broken the long line of critical stage
cases.
A necessary element in determining whether a
fact situation is a critical stage is whether a lawyer
would be of assistance in those circumstances
claimed to be a critical stage. If the prejudice to a
defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel
can be remedied without counsel at the point
claimed to require his presence, such as a lineup,
then the necessity of having an attorney there is
obviated. That point is not a critical stage so the
right to counsel does not attach."
A corollary to the above criterion of critical stage
is that if counsel is necessary in a particular situa-
tion, then he must be able to do something which
will avoid or guard against prejudice to an effective
defense. This is clear in most other critical stages
cases.2 Wade imposed no duties upon counsel nor
did it offer any clues as to what he is to do at
Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S.
128 (1967); Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957);
Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85 (1955).
3The constitutionality and reasoning of Wade was
briefed and argued before the Court. See Brief for
Respondent at 23, Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
"See People v. Killebrew, 16 Mich. App. 624, 168
N.W.2d 423 (1969); State v. Williams, 97 N.J. Super.
573,235 A.2d 684 (1967).
3See, e.g., Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970);(In preliminary hearings, counsel could prevent the
case from going to the grand jury; he could preserve
testimony for later impeachment; he could make dis-
covery for the trial; and he could prepare for the medical
and mental examinations which could excuse criminal
liability.); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967)(Counsel could change the plea, make notice of appeal,
and present expertise for sentence mitigation); Esco-
bedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (counsel could
protect against self-incrimination); Hamilton v. Ala-
bama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961) (counsel could make insanity
pleas and move to quash the indictment).
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lineups. It simply stated a conclusion that he will
be able to avert prejudice."
This absence of affirmative duties for the lawyer
creates speculation as to his responsibilities.3 4 Un-
like an attorney in a Miranda situation, where the
accused is asked to respond to a question, the law-
yer in Wade cannot prevent the defendant from
taking part in the lineup. 5 While the Court in Wade
wanted to insure that pretrial identifications were
conducted fairly, it provided the attorney with no
means to achieve this goal.' 6 A lawyer is not em-
powered by Wade or any other Supreme Court de-
cision to dictate the forms of lineup procedures
for his client or to prevent suggestive practices."
In relation to gathering information to impeach
identification testimony because it was acquired by
a lineup, at least one commentator has noted that
attorneys rarely seek impeachment information
themselves. s Secondly, it is doubtful if an attorney
could himself become a witness to impeach identifi-
cation testimony. The ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility acts to prohibit such practices. 9 In
-1[It appears that there is grave potential for preju-
dice ... in the pretrial lineup, which may not be
capable of reconstruction at trial, and ... [the]
presence of counsel itself can often avert prejudice
and assure a meaningful confrontation at trial ...
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236 (1967).
Justices Black, Fortas, and Douglas and Chief Justice
Warren believed that petitioner's privilege against
self-incrimination was at stake in the lineup. Arguably,
their concurrence on the critical stage issue is rooted at
least partially on this fact.
34 For some suggestions on the lawyer's function at
lineups see Quinn, In the Wake of Wade: The Dimensions
of the Eyewitness Identification Cases, 42 U. CoLo. L.
R.v. 135 (1970); LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the
Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67
MicH. L. R.v. 39, 122 (1969); Comment, The Right
to Counsel During Pretrial Identification Proceedings-
An Examination, 47 NEB. L. REv. 740 (1968).
35 Participation in a lineup is not a violation of the
privilege against self-incrimination. United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757 (1966).
:' See Read, Lawyers at Lineups: Constitutional
Necessity or Avoidable Extravagance?, 17 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 339, 373 (1969), for assertion by Washington,
D.C., Legal Aid Bureau that lawyers can do nothing
to prevent unfairness at a lineup. Read's conclusion is
that a lawyer has no function other than observer.
See Comment, Right to Counsel at Police Identifica-
tion Proceedings: A Problem in Effective Implementation
of an Expanding Constitution, 29 U. Prr. L. REv. 65(1967), and Comment, Lawyers and Lineups, 77 Yrx
L. J. 390 (1967), both of which note that lawyers can
take little if any affirmative action at lineups.
18 Comment, Confrontation, Cross Examination, and
the Right to Prepare a Defense, 56 GEo. L. J. 939 (1968),
where it is noted that such information is generally
acquired by employees of an attorney or neutral
observers.
39 AMERICAN BAR AssociATIoN, CODE OF PRoEs-
SIONAL REspONSmILITY DR 5-102 requires that lawyers
sum, since a lawyer cannot necessarily do anything
to insure against prejudice at the lineup itself, other
than to observe the proceedings, it is doubtful if
such identification proceedings can be deemed a
critical stage.
Alternatives to an attorney's presence at lineups
suppurt the view that a lineup does not qualify as
a critical stage. Like Wade, the goal of Stovall v.
Denno4' is to guard against unreliable identification
testimony. It achieves this through pretrial hear-
ings which present a means of discovering evidence
with which to attack the credibility of these identi-
fications in trial. It also prohibits the admission of
identification testimony obtained through lineups
so unduly prejudicial and suggestive that they
constitute a denial of due process. Stovall presents
a true alternative to Wade. It is addressed to the
same substantive right-the effective assistance of
counsel.
The significant difference in the Wade and
Stovall approaches is that in the former there is a
presumption of suggestion in lineups, while in the
latter the suggestiveness and consequent prejudice
must be proven. Under Gilbert v. California,4' pre-
trial identification testimony is per se excluded
when obtained in the absence of counsel. Under
Stovall, there is no exclusion of the pretrial identifi-
cation unless the defendant can show that in the
totality of the circumstances the pretrial proceed-
ing was unnecessarily suggestive and the identifi-
cation unreliable by virtue of its suggestive origins.
As in Wade, hearings are required in Stovall to
determine the legality and admissibility of eyewit-
ness identifications. The courts have been incon-
sistent in their application of the Stovall test.42
Some have been strict in applying the criterion of
unnecessary suggestion;43 others consider the total-
ity of the circumstances in determining whether the
who become witnesses for their clients must disqualify
themselves henceforth as their attorneys.40 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
41Id. at 263.
4
2See Comment, No Panacea: Constitutional Super-
vision of Eyewitness Identification, 62 J. Cm. L.C. &
P.S. 363 (1971), and Note, Pretrial Identification
Procedures--Wade to Gilbert to Stovall: Lower Courts
Bobble the Ball, 55 MinN. L. REv. 779 (1971), for dis-
cussions of lower court applications of the Wade and
Stovall rules.43 These courts have set rules whereby certain con-
duct by the police and approaches taken in the lineups
themselves are per se unnecessarily suggestive and,
therefore, identifications obtained therefrom are
inadmissible. See, e.g., Foster v. California, 394 U.S.
440 (1969); Wright v. United States, 404 F.2d 1256(D.C. Cir. 1968); United States v. Clark, 294 F. Supp.
44 (D.D.C. 1968).
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pretrial proceeding results in irreparable mistaken
identification.
Although the Stovall and Gilbert approaches in
the exclusion of pretrial identification testimony
are different, the inquiry on the admission of the
in-court testimony is very similar. Many courts
have explicitly required the use of the same stand-
ards employed in Wade on the proof of independent
origins of identification when holding Stovall hear-
ings.45 Furthermore, the time of the hearings in
relation to the trial" and the rules on the exclusion
of the pretrial and in-court identifications in
Stovall are frequently identical to those in Wade.17
There are procedures other than the Wade ap-
proach whereby the defense can learn of the under-
lying circumstances of a pretrial identification.
First, the Stovall hearings themselves are a discov-
ery device whereby information can be acquired
for later use in trial. Second, under Simmns v.
United States,"1 decided after Wade, defendants will
be able to take the stand in hearings on motions to
suppress evidence and testify to the suggestiveness
of lineups and the possible unreliability of identifi-
cations without fear of admission at trial of any
incriminating statements they might make.4 9 Fi-
nally, in addition to the Stovall hearing itself and
the defendant's unfettered opportunity to testify
on the reliability of evidence, traditional discovery
'
4 When considering the totality of the circumstances,
the courts look to the witness' independent pre-lineup
basis of identification. If they find these bases are so
strong as not to be influenced by the suggestiveness of
the later identification proceeding, then, under the
totality of the circumstances, that proceeding was not
so suggestive as to result in mistaken identification. The
rationale of these cases is that the witness would have
identified the defendant at the lineup regardless of sug-
gestion. See, e.g., Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1(1970); United States ex tel. Rutherford v. Deegan, 406
F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1969).
45 Clemons v. United States, 408 F.2d 1230 (D.C.
Cir. 1968). See also cases cited supra note 43.6See United States ex tel. Ragazzini v. Brierley, 321
F. Supp. 440 (W.D. Pa. 1970); People v. Burwell, 26
N.Y.2d 331, 258 N.E.2d 714 (1970).
47 See, e.g., Clemons v. United States, 408 F.2d 1230
(D.C. Cir. 1968); Wright v. United States, 404 F.2d
1256 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Wade and Gilbert exclusionary
rules explicitly adopted).
390 U.S. 377 (1968).
19 This case eliminates one problem of finding altema-
tives to Wade which one commentator had previously
found unavailable. See Quinn, supra note 34.
is available. Brady v. Maryland o allows a defend-
ant to discover favorable evidence in the hands
of the prosecution. Doubtful, suspect, and unre-
liable-pretrial identifications and lineup proceed-
ings which relate to the credibility of trial
testimony should qualify as information favorable
to an accused and come within the ambit of Brady.
At least one court has held that such evidence at
the disposal of the prosecution must be disclosed
to the defense."1
The Stovall approach, coupled with free testi-
monial privileges and discovery to the defense,
speaks to the same prejudice as Wade. Therefore,
Wade's emphasis on insuring the effectiveness of
counsel can be achieved by other means. Since
counsel is not absolutely necessary at a lineup to
insure his subsequent effectiveness, then a lineup
cannot be a critical stage of the proceedings re-
quiring the right to counsel.
In limiting the right to counsel to post-indict-
ment situations, the Kirby Court not only has made
a radical departure from prior law, but has effec-
tively overruled Escobedo v. Illinois'2 and placed
the applicability of other right to counsel cases in
serious doubt. In declaring that a critical stage can
occur only after indictment, Kirby is inconsistent
with the Escobedo holding which states that a criti-
cal stage occurs when police activity becomes ac-
cusatory rather than investigatory. The critical
stage in Escobedo was pire-indictment, demonstrat-
ing that police accusatory activity can occur before
formal indictment. Some courts have held that
police photo identification proceedings are critical
stages requiring the right to counsel without con-
sidering whether these procedures are pre- or post-
indictment."' The application of the right to coun-
sel in these cases would certainly be limited by
Kirby. Although the Court in Kirby stated that its
inquiry was limited to determining whether Wade
should "extend" to pre-indictment situations, it
set a precedent of much more far reaching effect.
60 373 U.S. 83 (1962).
'H See People v. Ahmed, 20 N.Y.2d 958, 233 X.E.2d
854 (1967).
378 U.S. 478 (1964).
"See United States v. Zeiler, 427 F.2d 1305 (4th
Cir. 1970); Thompson v. State, 451 P.2d 704 (Nev.
1969).
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